french

Attention over time

7-day rolling share of analyzed posts/comments mentioning this entity · 90 daily points ending 2026-10-09

Final complete day: 2026-10-09. Attention was 0.2% — this entity appeared in 106 of 51,707 analyzed posts/comments in the seven days ending that day (114 mentions).

Each point is a seven-day rolling window of complete UTC days; a point is comparable only when at least 100 analyzed posts or comments fall inside it. A day with no analyzed records counts as zero; missing coverage is marked and never shown as zero. The series ends at the latest complete analyzed day — it never extends into the current incomplete day. How attention is measured.

Recent mentions

1. 2026-10-09 23:42 UTCComment

   You are mistaken on the industry I fear you forgot to incorporate the whole empire. The British out competed the Germans on planes and boat manufacturing aswell. Also eventually the British would be able build a nuke not in the short term. This post is showing that the British could beat the Germans on their own with enough time it would be a really long timeline though. So could the US and so could the Soviets given enough time though the US would need some island hoping. The fact the Germans even beat the French was insanely unlikely caused by French incompetence and complacency.

2. 2026-10-09 23:24 UTCComment

   A successful Operation Barbarossa just means the Wehrmacht and Schutzstaffel Einsatzgruppen death squads get bogged down in a massive, grinding and resource-draining counterinsurgency campaign. The Wehrmacht and Schutzstaffel Einsatzgruppen were usually overstretched, because of how the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht fragmented into interservice rivalries against each other. It was a deliberate creation of Adolf Hitler due to his fears of a possible military coup. The Wehrmacht faced chronic supply shortages. Especially food, fuel and tools for vehicle maintenance. The topography always highly favored the insurgents, we could look at Napoleon's punitive campaign against the Russian Empire. The Cossacks and local Russians were able to harass, pick-off, delay and demoralize the Grande Armée over the course of months. The Wehrmacht and Schutzstaffel Einsatzgruppen did face similar, more stiff resistance from the Soviet Partisans. Soviet Russia is vast with marshes and forests hindering the already overstretched Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen from effective surveillance of the population with road infrastructure poorly maintained remaining treacherous for foreigners to navigate through. Nazi Germany had already overstretched itself by occupying the whole of continental Europe, it diverts and spreads resources, manpower, logistics and industrial capacity to its absolute limit. Poor Wehrmacht logistics management made it worse than Napoleon, because at least he prepared massive supply depots and had limited objectives. Yet it was still disastrous. This made the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen predictable to Soviet partisans and movement of men and supplies lethal. Insurgents DO NOT need to win battles just make it prohibitively expensive combined, and coordinated with a conventional force make an insurgency even more deadly. All an insurgency needs are: - Sanctuary with local support, or cross border support. (Taliban and Mujahideen used the Afghan-Pakistan border for sanctuary, recruitment, rest & recorder and resupply) - Local popularity, works even better when the occupying force utilizes brutality or neglects the population. (ZIPRA and ZANU overwhelmingly lost every single battlefield engagement against the Rhodesian Security Forces. Yet they had majority black support and sanctuary in nearby countries) - Material, military and political support from an external power (The American Revolutionaries received significant financial, material and direct military support from the Spanish and French) - Political/ideological unity (Spanish Guerillas were united in the overthrow of the French installed monarchy by Napoleon) Counterinsurgents need to subordinate military actions to political strategic objectives, the Nazis didn't bother with adaptation, instead they just doubled-down with their genocidal policy. Alienating potential defectors to guarantee infinite enemies and strengthening resistance. Even if they systematically recruited defectors, it wouldn't have mattered considering how the Nazis needed to garrison and supply: Western and Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Soviet Russia including North Africa draining immense limited resources and manpower. It is a herculean task. Maximum brutality guarantees maximum resistance. The logistics of Operation Barbarossa was a self-inflicted military disaster, General Georg Thomas and Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus came to the same conclusion in a war game of Operation Barbarossa: - Soviet railway gauges were larger including the fact that the Wehrmacht didn't have pre-prepared replacement gauges and supply depots set up prior to the invasion. This would inevitably lead to massive delays, and enormous consumption on fuel. - The vast majority of the Wehrmacht was overly reliant on horse drawn carriages with very limited mechanization within divisions. The simulation showed that the Wehrmacht wouldn't be able to resupply frontline panzer divisions for 3 to 6 days cycles due to the long distance. - The Wehrmacht would face food shortages in Operation Barbarossa, because the Soviets would employ scorched earth forcing the Wehrmacht to further pressure their supply lines from Germany to the frontlines. Although the war game showed that the Wehrmacht wouldn't be able to live off the land OKH merely dismissed the issue. - Terrain and weather conditions were also considered but the Wehrmacht once again ignored the issue believing that it would end before winter. Paulus noted this specifically with half of the supply convoys would be stuck or delayed even under ideal circumstances; supply lines would just barely keep up with the frontlines. - Paulus noted that without a centralized logistics command everything would be chaotic, each army group would have managed their own logistics leading to poor coordination between Army Group North to South. Paulus's staff came to the conclusion that without a centralized logistics corp the army groups would compete for resources, create redundancies and foster rivalries leading to disruption of the whole operation. In conclusion, war is a competition between systems NOT battlefield engagements but a whole-of-system warfare that is why Rome crushed Carthage, the Union crushed the Confederacy and the Allied nations crushed the Nazis

3. 2026-10-09 21:48 UTCComment

   I'm French, I can explain if you want. But I'm surprised, people abroad know about this? What country are you from?

4. 2026-10-09 20:54 UTCComment

   I am French, and television shows that the bad things are actually many other things.

5. 2026-10-09 20:02 UTCComment

   You simplified it way too much and are acting like those students are all dangerous people, it's not the case. This is just a loud minority like in literally any other french riot. Also most of these crazy folks arent even students